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Evaluating the affordance–control interpretation of the relationship between performance
and object estimation has been proposed by psychophysical and psychonomic studies. This
study examined the weight estimation–performance relationship. Individuals with visual
impairment or blindness put shots that varied in weight among five scales. In Experiment 1,
only the perceived weight was a significant performance constraint. In Experiment 2,
the weight was perceived as heavier when the participants’ actions were manipulated
through cognitive interpretation. The increase in perceived weight appeared to be related
to performance and intrinsically scaled to the action, even when the action was only mental
rather than physical. The study’s findings suggest that bodily experience and action are
the basis for physical judgments and likely underlie other basic cognitive interpretations
of sensory stimuli. This suggestion goes hand in hand with the biofunctional approaches
which assume direct experience of the integrated wholeness of one’s body is fundamental
for developing other kinds of awareness. Different perspectives from oriental philosophy
and psychology are also discussed.
Keywords: affordance control, ecological approach, action, perception, biofunctional understanding, embodied
cognition
INTRODUCTION
Action-specific perception theory (or perception–action relation)
proposes that people perceive the environment in terms of their
ability to act in it (Gibson, 1979; Witt, 2011). It has guided
biofunctional studies on the relationship of perception to motor
control (e.g., Grezes and Decety, 2001). On the assumption that
judgments and productions of target size are good proxies for per-
ceived target size, studies (e.g., Witt et al., 2010) have interpreted
the empirically observed performance-estimated size relationship
as a performance–perception relationship. In goal-directed tasks,
when a player’s performance is better, the player’s estimate of
the target size is larger (e.g., Witt and Proffitt, 2005; Witt et al.,
2008; Cañal-Bruland and van der Kamp, 2009; Witt and Dorsch,
2009), and the mean estimate is larger for players with more easily
performed tasks (e.g., Bhalla and Proffitt, 1999; Proffitt et al.,
2003). Accordingly, this thesis has advanced that optical variables,
such as those that pertain to hitting a softball or putting a golf
ball, are scaled by metrics that emerge from action-specific body
organization (e.g., Proffitt and Linkenauger, 2013). Following this
argument, a person who performs well perceives targets (e.g.,
balls, holes) to be larger.
In general, these kinds of experiments share a number of
features. First, participants have explicit knowledge of their per-
formance levels prior to their making any size judgments (e.g.,
Witt and Proffitt, 2005; Witt et al., 2008). Second, the target is of
a single size (e.g., a softball or golf cup). Third, participants make
size judgments subsequent to extending the full trial complement.
Thus, the cognitive reevaluation of the goal size in light of the
estimated accuracy, in a sense, is not ruled out, and thus, the link
between perceived size and hit rate (i.e., performance) may not
be causal. Additionally, it is unknown whether the participants
were equally and implicitly aware of both the actual and the
retinal sizes of the targets. That is, the dependence of miniature
selection on the proximal–distal fit could not be measured. In
addition, performance would be expected to improve systemati-
cally with target size. In addition to any variations in actual target
size, whether there was a performance-estimated size relationship
could not be measured. For the above reasons, studies fail to
provide a full understanding of the performance-estimated size
relationship.
A novel method was thus introduced to provide less-explicit
visual knowledge of participants’ performance results (Lee et al.,
2012). Participants were confronted with multiple target sizes
rather than one, and they estimated target size during each
trial rather than after each round. It was found that target size
judgments correlate with prior success in hitting the target. In
affordances, the manner in which one uses his or her body to
interact with the environment affects his or her perception of
the environment. A later study supplemented findings by Jin
and Lee (2013) and reinforced the notion of affordance-based
control. On these grounds, the action-specific approach not only
provides robust evidence for the account of affordances but also
suggests that perception is mediated by internal processes by
demonstrating a new ontology for the behavioral sciences based
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on biologically relevant affordances rather than physical objects
(Jin and Lee, 2013; also see Turvey, 1992; Miller, 2007).
Perception is one’s only information source about the external
world and has been explained in many ways (Witt and Sug-
ovic, 2013); larger perceived goal sizes have been associated with
performance and are affected by the types of actions. If people
are unaware of their performance, then what coordinates the
relationship between perception and performance? Further, how
can a person reliably produce a beneficial perceptual change
(e.g., amplification) in performance? The embodied cognition
holds that the nature of the human mind is largely determined
by the form of the human body (Shapiro, 2011). Despite the
common biofunctional orientation between action-specific per-
ception and embodied cognition, analytic approach that captures
the “intuitions” we have about human functioning has not been
well developed in these fields. We are invited to more seriously
consider the philosophical issue of the “natural kind or proper
observable” (Millikan, 1999; Ellis, 2001, also see Rosch, 2000),
for which perception is a proxy in these types of experiments.
A different paradigm is proposed here of explaining the rela-
tionship between action and object estimation, and this expla-
nation might be independent of the physical action status, in




Nine individuals with blindness (one female and eight males),
aged 31–42 years (M= 36.88 year, SD= 2.90), were recruited with
the assistance of the provincial Disabled Persons Federation. Of
the nine participants, six were adventitiously blind and three were
congenitally blind. Total blindness was a universal characteristic,
and the age at sight loss ranged from 0 (congenitally blind)
to 33 years old. The subjects were orally informed of the con-
sent agreement. One participant (female) was excluded from the
analysis because she withdrew during the tasks. The participants
were paid 50 Chinese yuan (CNY) as compensation. Because the
sample size was similar to the study by Lee and colleagues (Lee
et al., 2012; Jin and Lee, 2013) and smaller than the study by Witt
and colleagues (Witt and Proffitt, 2005; Witt et al., 2008), for a
direct comparison, we report rank-order correlation coefficients
(see results below).
MATERIALS
The experiment was conducted in a field with ample surround-
ings. The participants were instructed to put five artificial shots
with varying weights as far as they could. The standard weight
is 3 kg (3000 g); the weights of the five shots used in this study
were 1000, 2000, 3000, 4000, and 5000 g (Figure 1). The diagonal
lines of these shots were identical (13 cm). To provide their
weight estimates, the participants selected one of eleven solid balls
(diagonal lines, 13 cm), which varied from 500 to 5500 g in 500 g
increments.
PROCEDURE
When the task began, participants were required to hold the shots
for approximately 10 s and then use a standard putting method
FIGURE 1 | A shot and a solid ball used in Experiment 1.
FIGURE 2 | Putting the shot without run-up.
without run-up (Figure 2), as taught by the experimenters, before
proceeding to the experiment. Immediately after putting, the
participants were required to use the same hand they had used
to put to quickly weigh eleven solid balls in turn and then provide
an approximate estimate of the weight of the shot they had just
put. The instruction “estimate a weight that feels most like the
shot you just put” was given. The perceived weight measurements
presumed that the participant was implicitly aware of both the
physical (the shots) and proximal (the solid balls) weights at
equal levels (Carlson, 1960). The separate reports of the two
weights are provided independently (Ashby and Townsend, 1986;
for a discussion of decisional separability and signal detection, see
Oberle and Amazeen, 2003).
There were 25 putting trials for each participant, five trials for
each shot. The solid balls were randomly assigned, and they varied
from trial to trial. The participants were not provided the actual
weights of the shots, and the shots’ weights also varied randomly
over the trials. After each trial, the shot was taken away, and a new
shot was provided by the experimenters. The putting distance was
Frontiers in Psychology | Cognition February 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 96 | 2
Jin et al. Control the affordance
FIGURE 3 | Mean putting distance for the eight participants against
perceived weight (i.e., implicit judgments of proximal weight, but
c.f. Lee et al., 2012).
recorded as the performance level. The participants could choose
to pause briefly between trials to avoid fatigue.
We used three experimenters: one assisted and instructed the
participants throughout the procedure, one recorded the partici-
pants’ weight estimations, and one measured the putting distance
near the “target” (beyond).
RESULT AND DISCUSSION
The separate reports between the weights of solid ball and physical
shots can be provided independently. However, the R square value
between the perceived and proximal weights of 1000, 2000, 3000,
4000, and 5000 g were 0.69 for the eight participants, t(38)= 9.20,
p = 3.34e-11 (rs = 0.83, N = 40, 1-tailed p = 1.13e-11), which
reveals that perceived weight depended on the actual shot weight,
as well as implying that the participants systematically related
their weighing of the solid balls based on the fit between the shot
and solid ball weights.
The participants judged the shots as heavier when the actual
shots were heavier. The putting distance was also greater when
the shots were lighter, r2 = 0.30, t(38) = −4.05, p = 2.43e-4
(rs = −0.54, N = 40, 1-tailed p = 1.66e-4). Importantly, the
putting distance correlated with perceived shot weight (Figure 3).
However, if the perceived weight is considered to be an indepen-
dent variable rather than dependent variable, multiple regression
analysis revealed that only the perceived weight predicted the per-
formance, r2 = 0.53, β = −0.02, p = 1.24e-7, and the actual shot
weight was not a significant constraint for the putting distance,
p= 0.404.
The performance–perception relationship could be inter-
preted using the empirically observed performance–estimation
relationship. Many studies have scaled performance using metrics
from action-specific body organization (e.g., Witt et al., 2010).
Previous studies also confirm that unitary coordination, which
comprises bodily status and action processes (e.g., muscle work),
is responsible for the performance–estimation relationship. This
coordination determines the performance accuracy (level) relative
to the target. The results are in agreement with those provided
by Lee et al. (2012). For example, a person standing by a creek
may consider it too wide to jump across, but a person who is
running and approaching the creek may have a high chance of
a successful jump because the creek is visually narrower when
a person is running than when he is standing, which “affords”
jumping. As perception improves, the person begins to clearly
feel how the body is connected and how actions are naturally
integrated systems rather than merely coordinated and controlled
separate parts. In this study, putting form is primarily registered
by the haptical system (Turvey and Carello, 2011). This suggests
that perception was scaled based on the perceived levels of coor-
dination and control for any given action.
Our mental busyness, however, is a distinct distraction from
accurate perception and awareness. In fact, it appears as though all
of our senses are dulled by thinking (Brown and Cordon, 2009).
Therefore, it might be that participants’ cognitive form during
putting constrains their immediately subsequent proximal weight
judgments. Accordingly, a manipulation that mentally affects the
haptically perceptible form, rather than the form per se, should




Ten blind men (one female, nine males; M age = 38.30 year,
SD = 3.4) from the same population participated in Experiment
2. Seven were adventitiously blind, and three were congenitally
blind. Total blindness was a universal characteristic, with age at
loss of sight ranging from 0 (congenitally blind) to 31 years. The
same apparatus from Experiment 1 was used.
PROCEDURE
Participants were told that if they found the task to be too
emotionally taxing or uncomfortable, they could terminate it at
any time. The same experimental procedure from Experiment 1
was used with one exception: Experiment 2 included an addi-
tional condition, action imagination. The participants were not
informed that they would perform the task in two ways. One task
comprised half of the trials; Experiment 2 replicated the detailed
procedure from Experiment 1.
The other task constituted the remainder of the trials. The
participants were ostensibly asked to take a hearing test, and
they were invited to wear a pair of special (Bluetooth) earplugs
and listen to an audio document. The participants also received
instruction through the earplugs. Prior to the task, the partici-
pants were told to imagine that they were walking a long distance
for exercise; simultaneously, an audio recording was played with
the continuous sound of a blind-guiding stick rhythmically tap-
ping on a road surface, the sound of breathing, a tread sound,
and an indication voice stating “you have walked X meters” that
was repeated at 18-s intervals using an audio-play device with
a remote wireless control. At one minute and a half (00:01:30),
an indication voice with the message “you are going to walk
uphill on a slope” was presented. As the recording advanced, the
stick-tapping rhythm became slower, more gasping accompanied
a slower tread sound, and the “X” communicated by the indi-
cation voice became shorter. When the rhythm, gasp, and tread
frequency reached a certain level, the audio recording did not
vary (00:02:30) but played continuously. The participants were
then instructed to proceed through the task. The audio recording
was constantly played until the task ended. The indication voice
stating “you have walked X meters on the slope” and “you are
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going to finish the exercise in about X minutes” kept repeating,
replacing the previous voice, at a certain interval. All of the
indication voice messages were triggered by an experimenter. All
of the “X” and “certain intervals” in the indication voice were
controlled by the experimenter depending on specific conditions.
In all of the imagination trials, the volume was adjusted to suit
the participants. For half of the participants, the task involved an
imagination preceded by the other task. In this experiment, each
of the five shots (1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 kg) for one task consisted of only
two trials. The relevant correlation results involving performance
(i.e., putting distance) are discussed in Experiment 1; we did not
measure performance in Experiment 2.
Participants received a simple questionnaire that asked about
the effectiveness of the imagination task. We asked whether
their imagination had involved more events than exercise and
whether it had involved more actions than walking. No partic-
ipant reported more events that were not related to exercise,
and three participants reported more actions, i.e., trotting and
running. After each task was completed, we also assessed the
participants’ moods—“How do you feel right now?”— on a scale
of 1 (very good) to 9 (very bad).
RESULT AND DISCUSSION
There were no effects on the mood test, for imagination task
(M = 3.70, SD = 1.64), and for normal task (M = 4.30,
SD = 0.95). The main effects of imagination (two tasks), task
order and actual shot weight (five weights) as well as the interac-
tion effects were tested using the analysis of variance (ANOVA).
The mean perceived weights were 2990.2 g (SD = 1250.65)
for the normal task and 3220.60 g (SD = 1300.97) for the
imagination task. The difference was significant, F(1,8) = 30.76,
p = 0.001, η2 = 0.79. A strong significant effect from the actual
shot weight was also observed, F (4,32)= 203.37, p= 0.2.83e-22,
η2 = 0.96. Post hoc multiple comparisons using the Bonferroni
correction showed significant differences (ps < 0.01) between
all shot weights: 1 kg (M = 1440.5 g; SE = 110.92), 2 kg
(M= 2140.00 g; SE= 120.04), 3 kg (M= 3220.00 g; SE= 140.65),
4 kg (M = 3890.50 g; SE = 100.10), and 5 kg (M = 4840.50 g;
SE = 70.98). The analysis did not reveal any other significant
effects. Table 1 shows the perceived weight for each actual shot
from the different tasks.
In Experiment 2, the participants exhibited significantly
increased weight perceptions when they imagined voluntary
actions accompanied by the audio aids. We did not physically
manipulate the haptically perceived levels in Experiment 2; how-
ever, the perceived levels that were cognitively invited concur-
Table 1 | Mean estimation of proximal weight (SD) as a function of
physical weight and task type in Experiment 2.
Proximal weight (g)
Physical weight (kg) With imagination Without imagination
1 1510 (420.80) 1380 (390.94)
2 2270 (400.57) 2010 (380.72)
3 3280 (460.62) 3160 (460.24)
4 4100 (410.37) 3690 (350.73)
5 4970 (290.08) 4720 (300.84)
rently increased the proximal weight judgments. The results from
Experiment 2 provide evidence for the speculation that in a given
trial, the weights judged in Experiment 1 were scaled to the
coordination and control action levels for that trial; the levels
were cognitively rather than physically manipulated. Perception
is cognition because people’s actions (e.g., running, walking, etc.)
occur in their minds and in reality. Humans can use this cognition
as a basis for adapting to (or better accomplishing) a task in a
given environment. The concept of this ability has a clear position
in oriental philosophy (see general discussion below).
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Based on studies by Fajen (2007), Fajen et al. (2009), Lee
et al. (2012), and Jin and Lee (2013), putting is an exam-
ple of affordance-based control. For blind persons, the shots’
weights varied with the forms of touching, holding, weighing, and
putting. The perceived weights reported by the participants were
implicit reports of their “puttability” estimates. Shockley et al.
(2004) suggested that physical dimension estimates are elliptical
indications of affordances. In this study, the weights varied sys-
tematically with the masses distributed to the participants’ hands;
thus, manipulation affected the hand-wielded objects’ perceived
movability or controllability. Affordances might be sufficiently
fundamental that they necessarily constrain weight judgments
(Fajen and Phillips, 2012). Thus, heavier shots are more difficult
to put than lighter shots, and accordingly, perceiving a shot’s put-
to-be reflects the perception of that shot’s weight.
Under the traditional paradigm, affordance is nested in envi-
ronment. The following question ensues: what could make the
outer affordance available? A person with visual impairment may
depend more on a (haptical or olfactory) perceptual system for
survival than a normal individual. These individuals perceive
objects not only through bodily actions but also by controlling
affordance before the action. Improving the ability to feel and
be mindful of actions can be fundamental to how one improves
performance. The process is grounded in awareness: the essential
tool of the mind that firmly roots it back into the body. Not only
does this awareness foster a body that is free from restriction, but
it also serves as a tool for calming the overactive mind. During
the entire putting process, a blind man would exhibit a puttable
effect, which may support the general thesis that affordance has
an effect. As we have reiterated, if perception is cognition because
people form perceptions in their minds, in reality, manipulations
that affect the cognitive form should also affect weight judgments.
Fatigue and muscle strength are measures of overall bodily energy,
which can be considered a latent variable. One might describe the
effects of neurotransmitters on this latent “bodily energy,” in con-
trast to focusing on molecular or cellular actions. Research shows
that people’s physiological and psychosocial resources influence
their visual perception (e.g., Harber et al., 2011). This approach
is similar to studies on the higher-level cognitive-emotional-
physical effects of drugs such as antidepressants, the physiological
actions of which are not well-understood.
In this study, the participants were activated by an action in
which the putters’ perceived levels of coordination and control
were presumably lower. In the mind, this action may have con-
strained the proximal weight estimates; if so, the possibility that
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many other manipulations, such as emotional, motivational, and
procedural activation, among others, affect perception cannot be
ruled out. For example, in a controversial study, participants for
whom an elderly stereotype was primed walked more slowly than
did control participants (Bargh et al., 1996). Our results do not
robustly contribute to the argument about priming effect replica-
bility (Doyen et al., 2012; Yong, 2012). Paraphrasing imagination
in the present study, manipulations that only affect perceived
levels of coordination and control also affect the judgments of
proximal targets, goals, or objects, which provides organisms with
affordances that suggest that the proximal weights judged were
intrinsically scaled to the current perceptual systems (e.g., haptic
and auditory). This suggestion is somewhat consistent with the
study by Lee and Schnall (2014), although it demonstrates that
power, which drives potential strategies for gaining resources, can
affect perception; people see the physical world as reflecting the
difficulties posed by their lack of potential actions.
Many people experience the relationship between judging the
“actable-ness” of a target and performance when the form is
correct and they perform well. However, in empirical studies,
differences or changes in perception observed under conditions
without external behavior may be considered behavioral informa-
tion and may be used to assess participants’ effects on behavior.
Similar to the aforementioned blind person’s special survival
skills, normal people who are well-trained are more apt to per-
ceive the actable-ness of an object for better performance (e.g.,
Lee et al., 2012; Experiment 1) because they can adjust their
perceptual systems to control the affordances and obtain high
levels of perception. Deliberately sensing the body brings people
directly into contact with the present moment, which trains the
mind to focus as if on automatic pilot. Modern neuroscience
literature suggests that this trained “presence” actually builds new
neural pathways within the brain and is akin to the highly prized
“zone” (Robinson, 2004) that top athletes enter when they are in
good form. The findings in this study also share some similarities
with various “mindfulness” practices that are fashionable at the
moment. People can manipulate perceived performance levels in a
given environment, and this ability might render outer affordance
available.
Behavior is traditionally considered a means to control the
environment, but this view ignores the fact that an object can
be perceived through action. People sit after they confirm the
distance between a table and a bench; people may also first sit
down and then reevaluate or adjust their distance. Although the
initial stimulus is always perception, the interaction continues
back and forth between perception and action. Biological stud-
ies have found that self-generated sensations are attenuated by
a predictive mechanism and suggest that the nervous system’s
ability to predict an action’s sensory consequences may be used for
other mechanisms in addition to its role in sensory attenuation
(e.g., Bays et al., 2006). Our ability to mentally rehearse move-
ments before performing them may be attributable to this type
of prediction. Cognition guides behaviors that acquire the per-
ceptions necessary for new behaviors. The two behaviors before
and after the cognitive process (e.g., reappraisal) communicate
environmental information. Gibson (1979) conceptualized this
information as survival-related symbols given by the environment
to an organism. Post-Gibson researchers have also advocated
the notion that affordances are dispositional symbols of physical
objects that necessarily actualize related actions under appropriate
circumstances (e.g., Caiani, 2014). The concept of survival is
similar to that of Chi energy (are also known as Kih paradigm)
in oriental philosophy (Lee et al., 2007; Jin and Lee, 2013),
which defines affordance-control ability. Since ecological account
showed direct perception and denied the need for any internal
processing of biologically relevant cues to perceive meaningful
affordances, it seemed to offer nothing to the analytically oriented
cognitive science (e.g., Ullman, 1981). Coordination and control
are not only external actions but also level variables of internal
affordance-control ability.
It may be difficult to explore to a larger extent what demands
might be required for more successful performances. In this study,
people may have perceived that the shots were heavier if their Chi
had been energetic. Action is not only external but also internal;
it even exists in a mental form, the mental processes for which
may be regarded as a level of the Chi variable. Chi paradigm is
more like a general theoretical framework that claims a bodily
experience; action is the basis for making physical judgments and
likely underlies all other basic cognitive interpretations of sensory
stimuli. This goes hand in hand with the biofunctional under-
standing which assume direct experience of the integrated whole-
ness of one’s body is fundamental for developing other kinds of
awareness (e.g., Rosch, 1999). Specifically, the basis for percep-
tions may be understood in biofunctionalism which approaches
the body as a dynamical system seen in their functional, rather
than anatomical capacity, even at the sublevel (e.g., a bodily organ
such like brain, Iran-Nejad, 2000). It appears that we cannot help
separating mind from body in Western philosophical dogma. In
order to understand the integrated nature of the mind and body,
we must recognize that the mind, as a function of the brain, is
essentially embodied. If we approach the mind and body as an
integrated unit, we cannot separate training our muscles from
our mental activity because they are unavoidably linked. Training
the body perceptively necessitates quietening and training the
mind as it actively engages in its observant and embodied nature.
Chi paradigm offers a potential analytic approach to capture the
intuition of wholeness in terms of biofunctionalism within the
cognitive sciences.
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